School Desegregation Doctrine: The Interaction between Violation and Remedy by Gutermann, Paul Eric
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 4
1980
School Desegregation Doctrine: The Interaction
between Violation and Remedy
Paul Eric Gutermann
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Paul Eric Gutermann, School Desegregation Doctrine: The Interaction between Violation and Remedy, 30 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 780 (1980)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol30/iss4/7
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION DOCTRINE: THE
INTERACTION BETWEEN VIOLATION AND
REMEDY
Since 1954, when Brown v. Board of Education was decided, the Supreme Court
hasfollowed a path of "result-oriented" segregation remedies. The most recent step
along thispath was announced in the 1979 Columbus and Dayton segregation cases.
In this Note, the author traces the evolution of current desegregation doctrinefrom
Brown to thepresent, and analyzes these decisions in terms of the scope of the rem-
edy contemplated by each and the modycations in the plaintffl's burden ofproof
which were necessary to provide such remedies. The author concludes that although
the Supreme Court has from time to time wandered/rom thepath of result-orienta-
tion, the Columbus and Dayton decisions reaffirm its commitment to actual desegre-
gation.
INTRODUCTION
ON MAY 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court decided in
favor of schoolchild Linda Brown, holding that the statutorily
mandated segregation of white and black children in public
schools was unconstitutional.' The unanimous decision in Brown
v. Board of Education' (Brown 1) marked the first step along a
circuitous path in the interpretation of the rights of minority chil-
dren under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The doctrinal simplicity of 1954 has become in 1980 a
constitutional conundrum. This Note addresses a fundamental
reason for the present confusion-the Supreme Court's alteration
of the level of proof required to establish a constitutional viola-
tion, in order to control the scope of the remedial plan to be im-
posed.
The facts of Brown I were as simple as the doctrine they
spawned. Pursuant to a Kansas statute which permitted but did
not require segregation in public schools, the Topeka school board
had chosen to operate segregated elementary schools.3 The
Supreme Court ruled that separation of children in public schools
solely on the basis of race deprived minority children of equal
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Id. Brown consolidated four appeals from four different states: Briggs v. Elliot,
103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952) (Clarenden County, S.C.); Davis v. County School Bd.,
103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952) (Prince Edward County, Va.); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951) (Topeka, Kan.); Gebhart v. Belton, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 91
A.2d 137 (1952) (New Castle County, Del.).
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951).
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protection of the laws;4 the broad constitutional doctrine which
emerged was deceptively simple: segregation in public schools
caused by intentional state action was unconstitutional.
The doctrine required plaintiffs to prove three elements: (1)
intentionally segregative behavior, (2) by a state or local govern-
ment body, (3) which caused the present segregated condition.5
Under this formula, where a state statute or constitutional provi-
sion permitted or required segregation, plaintiffs could easily es-
tablish a violation. Consequently, all of the early litigation
focused on the formulation of an appropriate remedy.6 The reme-
dial rule which eventually emerged required these "statutory dual
school systems ' 7 -in which there was no racial intermingling at
all-to convert to unitary systems "in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch."8 In meeting this standard,
the Court often sought to achieve a racial mixture in each school
which statistically approximated the racial composition of the
school district as a whole.'
In 1971 the Supreme Court faced a new problem-segregation
in a major southern city apparently caused by a variety of fac-
tors.' 0 Although there had been a statutory dual school system in
the city's recent past, school attendance at the time of the suit was
determined by geographic zoning-a racially neutral system
under which students attended the schools nearest their homes.
Accordingly, school officials argued that residental segregation,
not intentional state action, had caused the present segregation. I
The Court responded by creating a rebuttable presumption that
intentional school board action caused the present school segrega-
tion. This shifted onto defendant school officials the burden of
proving that residential segregation or any factor other than
4. 347 U.S. at 495.
S. The Court never expressly stated the elements of a constitutional violation in
Brown; they were, however, articulated in later cases. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No.
I, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 205-06 (1973).
6. See notes 28-72 infra and accompanying text.
7. For the purposes of this Note, the term "statutory dual school system" refers to
those school systems where segregation of school children by race was permitted or re-
quired by state constitutional or statutory provisions. These school systems were called
"dual" because there were, in fact, two school systems within a single district, one for white
children and the other for black children.
8. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (al-
lowing racial percentages to be used only as a starting point in the process of shaping a
remedy).
10. Id.
11. See 1d. at 20-21.
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school board action had, in fact, caused the segregation.12
Two years later another problem arose in a school district
which had never had a statutory dual school system. Plaintiffs al-
leged that school officials, acting alone rather than under color of
state statute or constitutional provision, had caused the present
segregated school system.' 3 In other words, plaintiffs sought to
prove that a "nonstatutory dual school system" existed. 4 Proving
the existence of such a school system was much more difficult, as
plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the cumulative effect of inten-
tionally segregative school board decisions caused or maintained
the present segregation.' 5 The Supreme Court again responded
with a presumption: if it could be shown that intentional school
board decisions had caused segregation in a meaningful portion of
the school district, then it would be presumed that the school
board had acted with segregative intent toward other schools in
the district as well. 6 The defendant school officials then had the
burden of proving that they had not acted with discriminatory in-
tent.
Through the application of these presumptions, the Supreme
Court shifted the burden of proving difficult issues of fact onto the
defendant school officials. Consequently, the plaintiff's burden of
showing a constitutional violation was relaxed, and remedies were
easier to obtain. If remedies became more readily available, how-
ever, their imposition on an entire school system was a different
matter. Several members of the Court, notably Justice Powell,
were troubled by the social disruption that resulted when a sys-
temwide remedy was imposed in response to segregation in iso-
lated areas within a school system.'7 This concern led first to a
refusal by the Court to take the view of violations necessary to
impose an expansive remedy under Brown.' 8 It then led to the
introduction of an alternative remedial formula that would be
12. Id. at 26.
13. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
14. The term "nonstatutory dual school system" refers to school districts which be-
came segregated because of the intentional acts or omissions of state or local school offi-
cials, who acted without the benefit of a statutory or constitutional mandate. When a
nonstatutory dual system is found to exist, the remedy imposed is identical to what it would
have been had the dual system been statutorily required or permitted. See text accompa-
nying notes 101-44 infra.
15. 413 U.S. at 198.
16. Id. at 208.
17. See notes 129-42 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 147-61 infra and accompanying text.
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more deferential to local control of public education.' 9 In sum,
the Court seemed to be moving toward limiting the power of
lower courts to order systemwide remedies by requiring more ex-
acting proof of a constitutional violation.
This reversal in the Court's school desegregation doctrine was
short-lived. Two recent decisions, Columbus Board of Education v.
Penick2 ° and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton
Z1),21 appear to reaffirm the Court's commitment to desegregation
of the nation's public schools. The opinions in these cases pre-
serve the presumption, developed in earlier decisions, which posits
a causal nexus between past intentional school board action and
present school segregation. The Court went further, however, and
created yet another presumption which bears on both causation
and intent:22 once a dual school system evolved, there arose an
affirmative duty on school officials to dismantle that system. If in
the intervening years segregation persisted and school officials
took no further action, they had the burden of proving that their
past segregative decisions were not the cause of the present segre-
gation, and that their failure to act was not motivated by intent to
segregate. By reaffirming the causal nexus formula for establish-
ing a constitutional violation, and by creating an additional pre-
sumption of school board intent to segregate, the Columbus and
Dayton II decisions continue to make a systemwide desegregation
order easier to obtain.
This Note traces the development of school desegregation doc-
trine from Brown I to Columbus and Dayton I, and explores the
manner in which the Court's fluctuating doctrinal standards have
generated tension between the scope of the remedy imposed and
the plaintiffs burden of proving a constitutional violation. This
Note first describes the difficulties which occurred in the course of
formulating appropriate remedies for a statutory dual school sys-
tem.23 It then traces the doctrinal developments which resulted
when federal courts began to implement desegregation plans in
both the South24 and the North,25 and which shifted the burden of
proof to the defendant school officials on the issues of present cau-
19. See notes 162-78 infra and accompanying text.
20. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
21. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
22. See notes 180-256 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 29-72 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 76-100 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 100-43 infra and accompanying text.
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sation and segregative intent. This Note also explores the
Supreme Court's reaction to the social disruption which accompa-
nies desegregation decrees.2 6 In an attempt to alleviate this dis-
ruption, the Court tentatively raised the level of proof required
before an effective remedy would be imposed.27 Finally, this Note
concludes that in two recent opinions the Court again reversed
direction and extended the doctrine of school desegregation be-
yond earlier boundaries.28
I. FROM BROWN TO GREEN: FORMULATING A REMEDY
In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)29 the Supreme
Court, faced with straightforward facts, responded in direct, defi-
nite language: "[Tihe plaintiffs. . . are, by reason of the segrega-
tion complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
.... -30 The condition repugnant to the Constitution was
clear-total racial separation directly caused by the state.31 Spe-
cifically, local school officials had been authorized by statutory or
constitutional provisions to segregate children by race in public
schools; the statutory dual school system which resulted deter-
mined the attendance pattern of every school in the district. After
Brown, plaintiffs from school systems where racially separate at-
tendance was statutorily based had no difficulty establishing a
constitutional violation.32
Formulating a remedy for such a violation was not as simple.
In Brown, consideration of the appropriate remedy was postponed
until after reargument because "the formulation of decrees in
these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. '33 The
delay of over a year that preceded Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown H11) was indicative of the difficulties the Court was to
have with this issue; for the next fourteen years, the federal courts
would struggle to formulate an adequate remedy for a statutory
dual school system.
26. See notes 147-77 infra and accompanying text,
27. See notes 162-81 infra and accompanying text.
28. See notes 182-256 infra and accompanying text.
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. Id. at 495.
31. Id.
32. See Levin & Moise, School Desegregation Litigation in the Seventies and the Use of
Social Science Evidence: An Annotated Guide, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 50, 57 (1975).
33. 347 U.S. at 495.
34. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, was decided on May 17, 1954, and Brown I1, 349 U.S. 294,
was decided on May 31, 1955.
[ ol. 30:000
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Brown 135 articulated in broad, general language the remedial
duties of school boards operating these unconstitutional school
systems.36 School officials were required to "effectuate a transi-
tion to a racially nondiscriminatory school system."37 The Court
assigned to local school boards and district courts the responsibil-
ity of formulating the details of this transition.3" Before a district
court could prescribe a remedy for an unconstitutional condition,
however, it was necessary for the judge to know the exact nature
of that condition. Neither Brown opinion clarified whether the
object of a district court's remedy was to be the practice of racial
discrimination by a governmental body or the resulting condition
of racial segregation. While Brown I announced that "segregation
in public education" was unconstitutional,39 Brown II declared
that "racial discrimination in public education" was the constitu-
tional violation.4" The distinction between these two characteriza-
tions was crucial in delineating the scope of the remedy required.
If the condition of segregated schools was the constitutional viola-
tion, then the remedial objective would be to dissolve the racially
separate pattern and to reconstruct an integrated school system. A
remedial order which followed this objective would result in a
school system which was unitary in substance. Alternatively, if
the practice of racial discrimination was the constitutional viola-
35. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
36. Id. at 299-301.
37. Id. at 301.
38. Id. at 299. Although the Brown II decision directed lower federal courts to act
with "all deliberate speed," 349 U.S. at 301, the entire opinion actually was an open invita-
tion to southern intransigence. Its two most critical aspects were the deference given to
administrative difficulties and the discretion given to local district court judges to control
the remedy. Id. at 299-300.
One commentator has Asserted that the Court's deference to administrative problems
legitimized the maintenance of the unconstitutional status quo. In the belief that a more
aggressive court order might result in civil strife and open defiance by local officials, the
Court permitted delay in the implementation of a remedial decree. The Court justified the
delay by pointing to administrative problems attendant upon the communities affected.
Wilkinson, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation 1955-1970: A History
andAnalysis, 64 VA. L. REv. 485, 488-505 (1978). However, given the importance of edu-
cation to disadvantaged minorities recognized in Brown I, the justification for yielding to
potential administrative difficulties is not readily apparent. Id. at 489-90. Professor Wil-
kinson concludes that "Brown II can be justified, but just barely." Id. at 504.
In addition, Professor Wilkinson cites a number of authorities critical of the Brown II
opinion, including Loren Miller, a former NAACP vice president, who contended that the
"second Brown decision was a great mistake." Id. at 492 (quoting L. MILLER, THE PETI-
TIONERS 351 (1966)). See also Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46
WASH. L. REv. 3, 22 (1970).
39. 347 U.S. at 495 (emphasis added).
40. 349 U.S. at 298 (emphasis added).
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tion, the remedial objective would properly be limited to race-
neutral measures. A remedial order which followed this objective
would not necessarily result in actual integration; so long as
school officials did not assign students to schools on the basis of
race, the remedial objective would be met. The Supreme Court
has never expressly held which of these objectives is appropriate,
but the model which a given court adopts can be inferred from the
type of remedy ordered.4
Although both objectives were textually supported by the
Brown decisions, in retrospect it seems inevitable that the reme-
dial model of race-neutrality would be the one to predominate.
Less than two months after Brown II, a district court held that the
Supreme Court required only race-neutrality. In Briggs v. Elliot42
the court stated:
Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme
Court takes away from the people the freedom to choose the
schools they attend. The Constitution, in other words, does not
require integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It does
not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary
action.43
Since the race-neutral duty, as interpreted, did not require ac-
tual integration, racial separation was maintained and the process
of converting to unitary systems was delayed for almost nine
years.' Federal courts played a passive role, accepting or re-
jecting the desegregation plans proposed by state and local offi-
41. Fiss, School Desegregation.: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB.
AFF. 3, 28 (1974).
42. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (per curiam). The parties in this case were par-
ties in the original Brown suit. See note I supra.
43. 132 F. Supp. at 777.
44. One delaying tactic involved legislative action which closed public schools or
which enacted fund cutoff laws. Wilkinson, supra note 38, at 509-10. By this device, the
state (or local) government body could choose not to operate public schools at all when the
alternative was integrated schools. Id. Under the fund cutoff laws, any school system
which attempted to integrate its schools was subject to a denial of state funds. Id. The
federal courts quickly struck down these laws as violative of the equal protection clause; a
state could not close some schools and allow others to remain open. The courts reasoned
that if a state provided public education to some children, it had to provide education for
all. Eg., James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va.), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 1006
(1959).
Another, more subtle, legislative response was the enactment of pupil placement stat-
utes. Note, State Efforts to Circumvent Desegregation: Private Schools, Pupil Placement,
and Geographic Segregation, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 354, 363 (1959). Superficially, these stat-
utes comported with Brown II by assigning students to public schools on the basis of non-
racial criteria. Id. at 363-65. These statutes created a series of administrative proceedings,
through which individual blacks had to pass in order to challenge a placement decision,
thereby eliminating any chance of mass integration and leaving the initiation of desegrega-
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cials.45 The Supreme Court was even more passive, couching its
infrequent remedial orders in the negative,46 as if trying to guide
by veto alone. Only in the rare instances where its authority was
directly challenged did the Supreme Court take any real affirma-
tive measures.47
The Court's reluctance to move forward may be explained in
part by the absence of executive or legislative support. 48 In 1964,
however, congressional support did arrive. As school desegrega-
tion began its second decade, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.49 The Act granted the Department of Justice power
to initiate school desegregation suits50 and gave the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) power to promulgate
guidelines for achieving desegregation and to terminate federal
funds if those guidelines were not followed.5 t The Fifth Circuit
adopted the HEW guidelines as a remedial model and thereby
tion to individuals. McKay, "With ,411 Deliberate Speed" Legislative Reaction and Judicial
Development 1956-1957, 43 VA. L. REV. 1205, 1216-21 (1957).
In some instances, statutes of this type were invalidated. E.g., Bush v. Orleans Parish
School Bd., 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957). In others, however,
the Supreme Court gave tacit approval. E.g., Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957). Even where these statutes were approved, their
integrative effect was minimal. For example, in Charlotte, North Carolina, after three
years of operation under a pupil placement statute, only one black child was in a white
school. Wilkinson, supra note 38, at 512.
45. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation-Progress and Prospects, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 193, 203 (1964).
46. A typical example of the Supreme Court's action during this period was its deci-
sion in Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963). In Goss, a minority-to-majority trans-
fer provision in the Knoxville, Tennessee, school desegregation plan was invalidated. Id.
at 687. The plan involved residential zoning, but allowed pupils to transfer from schools
where they would be in the racial minority to a school where they would be in the racial
majority. Id. at 685-86. In the brief opinion which invalidated the plan, the appropriate
affirmative steps which could have been taken were not set out. Id. at 688-89.
47. E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). For details of the crisis in Little Rock,
Arkansas, which spawned Cooper, see Wilkinson, supra note 38, at 515-22. A far more
serious case occurred in Prince Edward County, Virginia, where, in reaction to desegrega-
tion orders, the public schools had been closed for five years. The state had subsidized
private schools for white children, and had left black children virtually without education.
The Supreme Court ordered the schools reopened in Griffin v. County School Bd., 377
U.S. 218 (1964). After ten years, an original Brown defendant was finally ordered to com-
ply.
48. See E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN, 291-92,(1977). Professor
Bickel has asserted that the inherent antimajoritarian nature of the judiciary required the
Court to move in measured steps until public opinion caught up. Bickel, supra note 45.
49. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d,
2000a-2000h-6 (1976)).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1976).
51. Id. § 2000d-l. The regulations appear in 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-.13 (1973).
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brought some degree of uniformity to remedial orders.52 More-
over, the three decisions which formally adopted the HEW stan-
dards were significant for another, more important reason-they
transformed the Fifth Circuit's remedial model to one which
would more effectively achieve actual integration. 3
The new formula incorporated the premise that the remedial
duty was affirmative: school boards must integrate, not merely
cease segregating. 4 School officials were required to undertake
the "liquidation of the state's system of dejure segregation and the
organized undoing of the effects of past segregation." 5 The Con-
stitution, in other words, required integration. 6 Accordingly,
since the states had created the systems which produced the segre-
gated attendance patterns, the states had the duty to dissolve
themY.5  The adequacy of a desegregation plan would be deter-
mined by its potential for producing racially diverse school popu-
lations. If a particular plan, using nondiscriminatory attendance
patterns, failed to achieve racial intermingling, it was unaccept-
able.58
The first widely used desegregation plan to be measured
against this standard was the "freedom of choice" formula, under
which students were allowed to attend the schools of their
choice.59 The freedom of choice concept was initially approved
by the Fifth Circuit6" and also by HEW.61 In theory these plans
52. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law ofSchool Integration Since Brown v. Board of
Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 19 (1975).
53. Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist. I, 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965);
Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist. II, 355 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
54. See Read, supra note 52, at 24-25 n.80.
55. 372 F.2d 836, 866 (5th Cir. 1966).
56. Notably, the initial interpretation of Brown, Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776
(E.D.S.C. 1955), did not require integration. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying
text. Judge Wisdom attacked the Briggs dictum in each of his three opinions for the Fifth
Circuit (Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist. I, 348 F.2d at 730 n.5; Singleton
v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist. II, 355 F.2d at 869; United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d at 846 n.5). The continued attractiveness of the Briggs
dictum was evidenced by the reappearance in 1973 of its basic concept in Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 258 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Justice
Rehnquist felt that Brown had merely prohibited discrimination and that Green's require-
ment of integration was, therefore, a significant expansion).
57. 372 F.2d 836, 866 (5th Cir. 1966).
58. Id. at 895-96.
59. See Levin & Moise, supra note 32, at 58.
60. Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist. II, 355 F.2d 865, 871 (5th Cir.
1966). The Fifth Circuit's acceptance of freedom of choice was somewhat of an anomaly
given its new remedial formula. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra. It appeared
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seemed adequate, but in practice they accomplished only minimal
integration. Choices for black children proved to be less than to-
tally free, as overt and covert pressure was applied to maintain the
segregated status quo.62
The Supreme Court struck down a freedom of choice plan as
unconstitutional by officially adopting the Fifth Circuit's remedial
model in Green v. County School Board.63 In Green, the Court
faced a rural community with little residential segregation, rela-
tively equal numbers of black and white school children, and two
schools' which had been established under a state constitutional
provision requiring racial segregation in public schools.65 Ten
years after Brown, the schools remained totally segregated. A
freedom of choice plan had produced negligible integration; no
whites had chosen to attend the black school where eighty-five
percent of the blacks remained segregated. 66
The defendant school board argued that Brown 11 required
only that students be assigned to schools according to nonracial
criteria, and that racially mixed schools were not mandatory.67
The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that the school officials were
"clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. ' 68 The re-
medial duty imposed by the Brown II decision, therefore, was one
of achieving actual integration, and the test of a school desegrega-
tion plan was its effectiveness in producing this result.69
Green ended the era of "all deliberate speed" and began a re-
sult-oriented era. The mandate was clear: after the existence of a
that the Court was approving a desegregation plan which did not achieve integration in the
very opinion which announced that remedial plans required racial intermingling. See Wil-
kinson, supra note 38, at 537-49. Apparently, however, at the time Singleton II was de-
cided there were no empirical data showing that freedom of choice plans were ineffective.
In United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), decided
later the same year, the Fifth Circuit observed that the usefulness of freedom of choice
plans was only as great as the vigilance of courts and school boards and the goodwill of
school boards and citizens. Id. at 888-89.
61. See Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53 VA.
L. REV. 42, 61-64 (1967).
62. See Wilkinson, supra note 38, at 539-40.
63. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
64. Id. at 432.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 441.
67. Id. at 437.
68. Id. at 437-38.
69. Id. at 439.
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dual school system was proven, the only constitutionally valid
remedy was one which eliminated segregation.7" Furthermore,
the responsibility for achieving this result was placed definitively
on the local school officials. 7
The Court drew a broad remedial principle from simple
facts-a rural southern school district with insubstantial residen-
tial segregation, only two schools, and a statutory dual school sys-
tem which, by definition, required total racial segregation at each
school. The rural, residentially integrated nature of the school
district made it easy to effectuate a remedy;72 a valid desegrega-
tion plan would have resulted in changes in only two schools. The
remedial mandate of Green was not difficult to follow in small,
relatively uncomplicated rural school districts. Urban school sys-
tems, however, were another matter.
II. SWANN: THE BRIDGE BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH
In June 1970, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
the desegregation plan for the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school dis-
trict in North Carolina.73 In contrast to rural school systems like
the one in Green-which had only two school buildings-the ur-
ban school system in Charlotte had a number of schools at both
the elementary and secondary levels variously situated throughout
its large school district.74 Moreover, unlike the Green system, it
was possible that factors other than intentional state action had
caused the school segregation. For example, the children in this
system were assigned to schools nearest their homes (a racially
neutral criterion), but because of substantial residential segrega-
70. Id. The Court stated that there was a "burden on a school board today to come
forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work
now." Id. (emphasis in original).
71. Id. at 441-42.
72. Id. at 441. Because there was so little residential segregation in New Kent
County, the only remedy needed was geographic zoning of school attendance areas. Id. at
442 n.6. For the same reason, freedom of choice in this community had been terribly ineffi-
cient; extensive cross-county busing had been needed to maintain the essentially segregated
nature of the schools. With geographic zoning, virtually no busing was required. See Wil-
kinson, supra note 38, at 546-49. Given the later opposition to busing, this fact seems to
imply that white parents were willing to have their children bused to school so long as the
purpose was to segregate.
73. Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 399 U.S. 926 (1970).
74. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971). The district was
the forty-third largest in the country covering 550 square miles with more than 84,000
pupils in 107 schools. Approximately 29% of the pupils were black and as of June 1969
two-thirds of them (about 14,000) attended schools which were 99% black. Id. at 6-7.
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tion the schools were largely segregated.75 The issue, therefore,
was whether intentional state action had caused the school segre-
gation or whether it was caused by independent factors such as
residential segregation.76 If the systemwide remedy contemplated
by Green was to be ordered for such a school system, plaintiffs
would have to prove that the school authorities had caused the
systemwide segregation, notwithstanding the independently segre-
gative conditions.
The lengthy litigation surrounding the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
school system shows the difficulty of such proof. The litigation
which ultimately reached the Supreme Court was a second at-
tempt at an effective remedy; the first desegregation plan, which
had not produced integration,77 was found to be inadequate by
the same court which had designed it.78 In its second attempt to
formulate a remedy, the court found that the segregation in the
schools was caused not only by the acts of school officials, but also
by residential patterns unrelated to school board decisions.79 In
short, not all of the segregation was a product of intentional state
action. Nevertheless, the district court ordered a systemwide rem-
edy involving groupings of outlying white schools with urban
black schools and busing in both directions.8" The Fourth Circuit,
however, reversed the portion of the decree which ordered busing
of elementary school children.8
The Supreme Court reinstated the district court order.82 Cit-
ing Green, the Court held that school officials were required to
"eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed
segregation."83 Yet, under prior doctrine, before a systemwide
remedy could be ordered, the existence of a state-created dual
75. Id. at 7.
76. See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Signqfcance for Northern School
Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697, 699-701 (1971). By formulating the issue in this
way the Court avoided the issue of whether the segregated pattern, without official conduct
as a cause, was a constitutional violation. Id.
77. The original desegregation plan designed by the district court had ordered geo-
graphic zoning, along with a free transfer provision which allowed children assigned to
schools nearest their homes to transfer to any other school in the district. Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 243 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.N.C. 1965), aj7'd, 369 F.2d 29 (4th
Cir. 1966).
78. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358 (W.D.N.C.
1969).
79. Id. at 1365-66.
80. 311 F. Supp. 265, 268-81 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
81. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 135, 147 (4th Cir. 1970).
82. Swann v. Charlotte-Meckenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971).
83. Id. at 15.
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school system had to be established; hence, the Court had to face
the lower court finding that some of the present segregation had
been caused by residential segregation.
The Court could have held that the plaintiffs were required to
show the proportion of segregation caused either by the former
statutory dual school system or by subsequent discriminatory acts
of school officials. The remedy would then have been limited to
correcting that increment caused by school authorities. In a large
urban setting such as Charlotte, this would have been a difficult
and complex causation issue, and the plaintiffs' chances of receiv-
ing a systemwide remedy would have been substantially dimin-
ished.
To avoid such an onerous requirement, the Court instead
chose to shift the burden of proof to the defendant school officials
by creating a presumption: "[wlhere the school authority's pro-
posed plan for conversion from a dual to a unitary system contem-
plates the continued existence of some schools that are . . .
predominately of one-race . . . a presumption [arises) against
schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial com-
position. ' 84 Thus, the defendant school officials had the burden
of proving that residential segregation, or some other independent
factor, had caused the school segregation. If they did not meet
this burden, the existence of a dual school system was proven, and
a systemwide remedy was in orderY
To justify the imposition of a presumption, the Court posited a
reciprocal relationship between residential segregation and school
segregation. 86 It noted that "the location of schools may influence
the pattern of residential development of a metropolitan area and
have important impact on composition of inner-city neighbor-
hoods."8 7 Therefore, school segregation, formerly required by
statute, had contributed to the segregated residential patterns. By
this reasoning, the Court maintained that residential segregation
was not an "independent" factor unless proven to be so by the
school board.
The importance of this presumption cannot be overstated.
One element of the constitutional violation-past discriminatory
84. Id. at 26.
85. Id. at 26-28.
86. "People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to
the needs of the people." Id. at 20.
87. Id. at 20-21.
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behavior which has caused the present segregation 88 -was more
easily proved with the assistance of the presumption. Especially
in complex urban school systems, where causation was almost im-
possible to prove, placing the burden of proof on defendant school
officials was a clear advantage for plaintiffs.
The presumption has been criticized,8 9 and much of the criti-
cism has focused on the fact that there was no clear evidence that
the posited relationship between residential and school segrega-
tion truly existed.90 Criticisms of this type, however, misconstrue
the function and nature of presumptions. The Swann presump-
tion did not conclusively determine the issue of causation. It
merely shifted to the defendant school officials the burden of
proving, for instance, that random residential segregation had
caused school segregation. Also, such criticism ignores the fact
that there are two kinds of presumptions: those based on
probability, and those based on policy.9 1 Although the burden of
proof is generally placed on the party who "seeks to change the
present state of affairs," 92 there are occasions when it is appropri-
ate to shift the burden to the other party.93 Accordingly, the shift
in the burden of proof announced in Swann could have been
based on the probability that the posited relationship between res-
idential and school segregation existed. Commentators, however,
have quite vigorously disputed this basis for the presumption.94
Nevertheless, a second, independent basis could have existed for
88. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Comment, Keyes v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern
Schoolhouse Doors, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 124, 130-33 (1974). The author suggests
that other factors have been more substantial causes of residential segregation, and that
even when school policy has had some effect on residential patterns in one area, it was not
necessarily a districtwide effect. Id. See also A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS, 136-37 (1970); Taeuber, Residential Segregation, SCIENTIFIC AMERI-
CAN, Aug., 1965, at 14.
90. See, e.g, Brest, Forward- In Defense oftheAntidiscrimination Princole, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 34 (1976). Professor Brest doubts the existence of the relationship, and asserts
that the Court was avoiding the question of whether a school desegregation order could be
based on segregation caused by governmental bodies other than the school board. Id. He
concludes: "It is doubtful that the processes described by the Chief Justice account for
much of the segregation in Charlotte and other metropolitan areas." Id.
91. E. CLEARY, McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 342 (2d ed.
1972). Most presumptions are based on both probability and policy. For example, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be based on the inference that the accident would not
have happened without someone being negligent (probability) or that the defendant had
better access to the proof (policy). Id. at 804-05.
92. Id. § 337.
93. Id.
94. See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text.
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the creation of the presumption-social policy. Minority school
children had been denied access to equal education for too long.
The only adequate remedy available in the Court's eyes may have
been one which altered the segregated structure and ameliorated
unequal conditions. If plaintiffs were required to prove a compli-
cated factual issue such as causation, then the likelihood of such a
systemwide remedy would have been significantly diminished. By
creating a presumption that shifted the burden of proving this is-
sue to the defendant school officials, the Court may have been
seeking to provide the opportunity for children to receive equal
education.
Swann thus continued the movement of school desegregation
doctrine toward a result-oriented approach.95 The Green remedial
standard required that desegregation plans achieve integration.96
The Supreme Court in Swann applied this remedial standard in a
case where it was unclear whether past discriminatory behavior
had been the sole cause of the current segregation in public
schools. The Court created a presumption that intentional state
action was in fact the cause of segregated conditions, and cast the
burden of rebuttal on the defendant school officials.
One commentator has suggested that the presumption was cre-
ated so as to attribute responsibility for segregated school sys-
tems.97 Yet, this attribution of responsibility was not universal;9
it was limited to those school systems where segregation was at
95. There were two other noteworthy aspects of Swann. First, the Court noted four
problem areas in the issue of student assignment. The Court held that: (1) racial quotas
might be used as a flexible starting point in shaping a remedy; (2) the continued existence
of one-race schools had to be scrutinized carefully; (3) an assignment plan was not accept-
able merely because it was race-neutral, and that district courts had the equitable power to
alter attendance zones; (4) school busing was an appropriate remedial tool. 402 U.S. at
22-31. Second, the Court warned that when school officials had achieved full compliance,
further intervention by district courts would not be necessary unless further intentionally
segregative conduct by school officials had caused segregation. Id. at 31-32.
This dictum became law in Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424
(1976). The Court there held that once a school board had complied with a desegregation
decree, a district court could not modify the decree to compensate for resegregation which
occurred through random migration. Id. at 435-37.
96. See notes 63-76 supra and accompanying text.
97. See Fiss, supra note 76, at 704-05. Professor Fiss regarded the connection to past
discrimination as a contrivance, since the Court had really focused on segregated patterns.
Id. at 705. He also predicted that the Court would gradually abandon its requirement that
school officials be responsible for segregated conditions, and would then lessen the reme-
dial burden. Id. at 705-06. This theory was borne out in Justice Powell's concurrence and
dissent in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 217 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part), discussed at notes 129-42 infra and accompanying text.
98. See Fiss, supra note 76, at 703-07.
[Vol. 30:000
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION DOCTRINE
least partially due to statutory provisions. Most northern school
systems had either never had statutory dual school systems, or had
had them only in the distant past.99 Consequently, the purely his-
torical nature of explicit discrimination in the North made any
attempt to attribute responsibility on the basis of a statutory dual
school system extremely weak. School desegregation doctrine had
to be expanded so that northern school systems, which were in-
deed segregated, could be subject to remedial orders.'00 For sev-
enteen years after Brown the Supreme Court had not reviewed
segregation in northern school systems. This state of affairs would
soon change.
III. KEYES: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION MOVES NORTH
Through experience, the Supreme Court had determined that
the only effective desegregation remedy was one which required
racial mixture in the student population of each school.' 0 ' In
southern districts, where the dual school system was required by
state statute, proof of a systemwide violation was easily met.0 2 If
the dual school system was not presently required by law, but had
been in the recent past, the Court had created a presumption that
the present school segregation was caused by the former statutory
dual school system.' °3 In northern school districts, not only were
the segregated schools not presently required by law, but also a
statutory dual school system had either never existed, or had ex-
isted only in the remote past. Therefore, in order to be awarded a
Green-type, systemwide remedy, plaintiffs from northern school
districts had to amass proof of a nonstatutory dual school system.
In order to implement school desegregation in northern school
districts, it was clear that the doctrinal proof requirements had to
be modified.
99. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in 1888 that state law prohibited the
segregation of school children. Board of Educ. v. State, 45 Ohio St. 555, 16 N.E. 373
(1888).
100. The expansion of school desegregation doctrine in Swann may have created a ten-
sion on the Court as to how far school desegregation was to be carried--tension which was
reflected in the dissolution of the Court's unanimity in school desegregation cases. See
Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). Four Justices, all Nixon appointees,
dissented from a denial of Emporia's attempt to form a separate school district after a
desegregation decree for the original county-wide district had been issued. Id. Professor
Wilkinson suggests that the majority had denied the separation because of their "longer
experience with southern resistance and evasion." See Wilkinson, supra note 38, at 557.
101. See notes 29-71 supra and accompanying text.
102. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 95-97 supra and accompanying text.
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The first northern school case to be decided by the Supreme
Court was Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado.i 4
The Denver School system had never been operated under statu-
torily or constitutionally mandated racial segregation, yet plain-
tiffs alleged that local school officials had created and maintained
segregated schools in the Park Hill areas of the school district. 0 5
The district court agreed and ordered the Park Hill area schools
desegregated.0 6 Plaintiffs then sought an order requiring integra-
tion of all the schools in the district, especially those in the core
city area. 0 7 In response, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs
had to make a new showing of intentional segregation in each
area of the city for which they sought relief, essentially ruling that
a showing of intentional segregation in one area of the city was
not probative of segregative intent in other areas of the city.'0 8
Since the court did not find intentional segregation in the core
area, but did find that the core area schools were racially unequal,
it ordered that measures be taken to equalize facilities, not to inte-
grate students. 109 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decree as to the
Park Hill schools but reversed as to the core area, concluding that
evidence was insufficient to prove a "constitutional depriva-
tion." 110
The Supreme Court ruled that both lower courts applied in-
correct legal standards." ' Since no statutory dual system had ever
existed, plaintiffs conceded that they had to prove that some other
form of intentional state action had caused or maintained the seg-
regated schools."2 The Court clarified the plaintiffs' burden by
noting that "the differentiating factor between dejure segregation
and so-called de facto segregation is purpose or intent to segre-
gate." 113 The Court held that the plaintiffs had met this burden as
104. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
105. Id. at 191-92.
106. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 303 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969).
107. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 313 F. Supp. 61, 69-73 (D. Colo.
1970).
108. Id. at 76-77.
109. Id. at 77.
110. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 445 F.2d 990, 1005 (10th Cir. 1971).
Ill. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973).
112. Id. Since the Court had never officially decided that intentional segregation was
a necessary antecedent of unconstitutionality, the plaintiff's concession of the issue may
have been unwarranted. See Note, Finding Intent in School Segregation Constitutional Vio-
lations, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 119, 126 (1977).
113. 413 U.S. at 208 (emphasis in original). De jure segregation is defined as that
segregation caused by intentional state action. In contrast, defacto segregation is that
which arises independently of any behavior by state or local government.
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to the Park Hill schools-a substantial portion of the school dis-
trict." 4 The defendant school officials argued that this finding of
segregative intent in one area of the district should be viewed in
isolation from the rest of the district. The Court rejected this ar-
gument, pointing out that plaintiffs had never been required to
prove dejure elements as to every school or every student." 5 This
response, however, was merely the statement of a truism, for prior
to Keyes, the Court had reviewed only statutory dual school sys-
tems where the segregation of every student in every school was
required by law. By definition then, dejure elements had existed
as to every student in every school. Denver, however, had never
had a statutory dual system which affected the entire student pop-
ulation. Thus, the Court's rejection of this argument was based on
inapposite precedent. Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to note a
"predicate for the finding of the existence of a dual system.""' 6
Since previous awards of a systemwide remedy had been con-
ditioned on proof of a systemwide violation, the Court had to pro-
vide an analytical method of proving a nonstatutory dual school
system in the northern school districts. The Court began by hold-
ing that a finding of segregative intent in one area of a school
district was highly probative as to the intent of school officials in
other areas of the district," 17 essentially determining that discrimi-
natory conduct directed at certain schools affected the racial com-
position of other schools in the district.
The Court then noted a number of actions taken by school
officials which had created this effect. For instance, the concentra-
tion of black students in certain schools, resulting either from ger-
rymandering attendance zones or from designating "feeder"
schools, had the reciprocal effect of keeping other nearby schools
largely white." 8 The same result occurred when schools were
constructed "with the conscious knowledge that they would be
segregated,"' 19 and when the use of mobile classrooms, transfer
policies, and assignment of faculty and staff served to segregate.120
The Court concluded that these actions tended to increase resi-
dential segregation, which, in turn, increased school segrega-
114. Id. at 198-99.
115. Id. at 200.
116. Id. at 201.
117. Id. at 207-08.
118. Id. at 201.
119. Id. at 201-02.
120. Id. at 202.
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tion. 12  In light of these effects the Court created a presumption
that:
a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a
meaningful portion of a school system . . . establishes. . . a
prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of
school authorities, and shifts to those authorities the burden of
proving that other segregated schools within the system are not
also the result of intentionally segregative actions. 1
22
Moreover, the Court held that this burden would not be dis-
charged by the school officials' reliance on a "racially neutral ex-
planation such as a neighborhood school policy."' 123
This presumption of segregative intent, in conjunction with the
Swann presumption as to causation, constituted the method for
proving the existence of a nonstatutory dual school system. The
typical northern urban school district consisted of a neighborhood
system of schools, which because of substantial residential segre-
gation, tended to be largely one-race. A plaintiff who sought a
desegregation decree had to prove that "intentionally segregative
school actions" had caused segregation in a meaningful number of
these schools; application of the Keyes presumption then shifted
to the defendant school officials the burden of proving a lack of
segregative intent in other areas of the district. School officials
would generally rely on a race-neutral policy (the neighborhood
school system) to prove lack of discriminatory purpose, implicitly
asserting that residential segregation had caused the school segre-
gation. Yet, the existence of one-race schools would invoke the
Swarn presumption, thus placing the risk of nonpersuasion on the
defendant school officials.'24 If neither presumption was ade-
quately rebutted, the existence of a nonstatutory dual school sys-
tem would be proven and a systemwide remedy would be
imposed.
The potency of the combined Keyes and Swann presumptions
has been criticized. Most of the criticism has questioned whether
school board actions directed toward one part of a school district
actually affected every school in the district. 25 However, such in-
quiry again ignores the nature and function of a presumption.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 208.
123. Id. at 210. The Court noted that although there may be instances of separable
units within a school district where discrete segregative effects occurred, "such cases must
be rare." Id. at 203.
124. See notes 84-88 supra and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 89, at 131-33.
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The elements of intent, causation, and underlying systemwide im-
pact, were still in issue; the Court merely had shifted the risk of
nonpersuasion. Moreover, presumptions can be based on both
probability and policy.12 6 Certainly, proof of segregative intent in
one part of a school district makes it more probable than not that
there was segregative intent in other areas of the district.127 Fur-
thermore, social policy supports the creation of the presump-
tions, 128 particularly the policy of treating the similar problems of
segregation in northern and southern school systems similarly.
Since the remedy (elimination of segregation) was to be identical
for both northern and southern school districts and since elements
of violation are more complicated and difficult to prove in north-
ern school districts, the Court relaxed the proof requirements for
northern plaintiffs. As one commentator has suggested, this policy
avoided the appearance that the Supreme Court was "picking on"
the South.
2 9
Another response to the Court's application of the presump-
tions and the result-oriented approach came from Justice Powell
in dissent, who offered an alternative model for school desegrega-
tion doctrine-a model which would have reduced the remedial
burden on northern school officials.' 30 Justice Powell first asserted
that although Brown merely prohibited states from requiring chil-
dren to attend segregated schools,' 3' the result-oriented approach
developed in Green and Swann required school officials to allevi-
ate segregated conditions which had been caused by independent
factors. 32 Since intentional state action was no longer a prerequi-
126. E. CLEARY, supra note 91, at § 343. See notes 91-94 supra and accompanying
text.
127. 413 U.S. at 207-08.
128. See notes 91-95 supra and accompanying text.
129. Fiss, supra note 76, at 705. In a later article, Professor Fiss also suggested that the
Court's underlying motive was to eliminate the segregated pattern and that the presump-
tions were simply a method of attributing responsibility to school officials for the present
segregation. Fiss, supra note 41, at 26. Another commentator, however, has argued that
this process legitimized racial discrimination, asserting that the Court's promise of resolu-
tioni through a remedial focus on segregation was rendered illusory by its requirement that
discrimination be proven before a violation could be found. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through 4ntidircrimination Law: 4 Critical Review of Supreme Court Doc-
trine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-57 (1978). But see Brest, supra note 90 at 44-48 (where
it is argued that without proof of discriminatory conduct, there is no constitutional basis for
judicial intervention).
130. 413 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131. Id. at 220.
132. Id. at 222. Justice Powell believed that random residential segregation was the
more significant cause of segregated schools. Id. at 223.
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site to a remedy, Justice Powell was prepared to abolish the de
jure/de facto distinction; 33 the condition of segregated schools it-
self would be a prima facie violation of the Constitution. Under
these circumstances, the constitutional right was the expectation
that "once the state has assumed responsibility for education, local
school boards will operate integrated school systems within their
respective districts."' 34
Notwithstanding his broad concept of constitutional violation,
Justice Powell would not have required every school in the district
to be integrated, 35 and he reasoned that federal courts "in requir-
ing so far-reaching a remedy. . risk setting in motion unpredict-
able and unmanageable social consequences."'' 36 To avoid this
risk, Justice Powell would have given more weight to the tradition
of locally controlled education and structured his remedy within
the framework of the neighborhood education system. 37 Unlike
the majority, Justice Powell believed that the greater degree of ac-
tual integration achieved by such means as busing were out-
weighed by important "community aspirations and personal
rights."'' 38 Among these interests were a desire that children at-
tend schools near home, 139 a "desire of citizens for a sense of com-
munity in their public education,"' 4 ° the possible detrimental
effect of busing on children,' 4 ' and the economic burdens of bus-
ing. 142
A comparison of Justice Powell's formulation with that of the
majority shows the divergent directions the Court could have
taken. Justice Powell clearly was more concerned with the local
interest in autonomous educational systems than with the national
interest in integrated schools. Rather than require racial mixture
in every school in a district, he would have balanced the value of
133. Id. at 224-25.
134. Id. at 225-26 (emphasis by Justice Powell).
135. Id. at 226-27.
136. Id. at 250.
137. Id. at 240.
138. Id. at 242. See also Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 275, 435-37 (1972) (where the author, focusing on
harmful educational effects of segregated public schools, concludes that the evidence was
strong enough to support a constitutional requirement that blacks be given voluntary ac-
cess to biracial or white schools (plus free transportation), but not strong enough to support
a requirement of mandatory desegregation for all).
139. 413 U.S. at 245.
140. Id. at 246.
141. Id. at 247-48.
142. Id. at 248.
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integration with other educational values; rather than modify the
plaintiffs' burden of proof so as to insure that a systemwide rem-
edy was ordered, he would have allowed the remedial formula to
conform to the exigencies of different, more complicated fact situ-
ations. In contrast, the majority created a presumption as to the
element of segregative intent, 14 3 applied it in conjunction with the
Swann presumption of causation,"' and arrived at a method of
proving the existence of a nonstatutory dual school system.
Therefore, a systemwide remedy of the type established in Green
was in order. Justice Powell's concern for the socially disruptive
effects of school desegregation plans was not frivolous, however,
and soon would be echoed by other members of the Court.
IV. THE COURT CUTS BACK
A. Milliken: The Rejection of an Interdistrict Remedy
Before 1973, the Supreme Court had reviewed only lower
court decisions which had found constitutional violations within a
single school district and had ordered desegregation plans which
were confined to those single districts. Yet, in some situations,
remedies affecting only one school district had proven to be inade-
quate ' 45 because of a demographic situation common to northern
urban areas-a predominantly black central city surrounded by
predominantly white suburbs, each with separate school districts.
This resulted in an imbalanced concentration of blacks in one
school district which could not be remedied by a desegregation
plan confined to that district.' 46 If the metropolitan area were
viewed as a whole, however, and a desegregation plan tailored so
as to incorporate suburban school districts, then the remedial ob-
jective of integration could be achieved. In order for the school
desegregation doctrine to deal effectively with metropolitan segre-
gation a further modification of the proof requirements for the
establishment of a constitutional violation would have to be made.
The district court in Bradley v. Milliken 1 recognized the inad-
equacy of a remedy limited to a single school district when deal-
ing with metropolitan segregation. The court found that Detroit
school officials, by means of intentionally segregative conduct,
143. See notes 115-23 supra and accompanying text.
144. See notes 82-88 supra and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67, 99-100 (E.D. Va. 1972).
146. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 916 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
147. 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
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had caused the segregation which existed in the Detroit public
schools.' 48 The court also found that the state of Michigan was
responsible for the segregated conditions, citing the state's own in-
tentionally segregative conduct, 49 and applying agency principles
which made the state responsible for the conduct of the Detroit
school board.' The district court concluded that a desegration
plan limited to the Detroit school district was inadequate,' 5' and
ordered the formulation of a metropolitan remedy.' z The subur-
ban school districts appealed this order, which the Sixth Circuit
affirmed.'5 3  In Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court re-
versed, t5 4 holding that the district court could not order a mul-
tidistrict remedy unless the plaintiffs proved that the suburban
school districts had operated dejure school systems and that there
was an interdistrict segregative effect.' 55 Since the plaintiffs had
not met these conditions, the remedy had to be confined to the
Detroit school district.'56 Thus, the Court refused to extend the
result-oriented approach which had been developed in Green,
Swann, and Keyes. 57 In light of the lower court findings of state
responsibility, the Court could have extended the remedy beyond
district lines' 58 by creating a presumption that interdistrict segre-
148. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 585-88 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
149. Id. at 588-89.
150. Id. at 593-94.
151. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 916 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
152. Id.
153. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973).
154. 418 U.S. 717 (1973). This case was not the first metropolitan remedy that the
Supreme Court had reviewed. One year earlier in School Bd. v. State Bd. of Educ., 412
U.S. 92 (1973), by a 4-4 vote (Justice Powell did not participate) the Supreme Court af-
firmed the court of appeals decision in Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir.
1972). The Fourth Circuit had reversed a district court order consolidating the Richmond,
Virginia, school district with two suburban school districts in a desegregation plan. Id.
155. 418 U.S. at 744. The Court did not discuss the finding of a violation for the De-
troit school district, but stated in a footnote that "under our decision last term in Keyes
.... the findings [of a constitutional violation] appear to be correct." Id. at 738 n.18.
156. Id. at 746. In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. 267 (1977), because the
intradistrict remedy did not achieve actual integration, the Court ordered additional pro-
grams to enhance the quality of education which black children would receive.
157. 418 U.S. at 742-45.
158. Indeed, the district court had held that the lines delineating a school district were
mere "administrative conveniences." 338 F. Supp. at 589. Professor Freeman supports this
notion. He points out the basic inconsistency of regarding school district lines as inviolate
while reforming neighborhood school assignments. He refers to local autonomy as "a
codeword for rationalizing and protecting the prior appropriation of financial resources,
environmental amenities, and in this case, racial homogeneity. In short, it is a principle of
vested rights." Freeman, supra note 128, at 1109.
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gative effects existed in metropolitan areas.' 59 Under such a pre-
sumption, the defendant school officials would have had to prove
that the effects of discrimination in the Detroit school district were
confined within district lines. By thus altering the proof require-
ments of a constitutional violation, the Court could have ensured
a metropolitan remedy, and hence actual integration.
Yet, the Court refused to do so. Rather than focusing on the
achievement of actual integration, the majority focused on an-
other aspect of desegregation remedies-the extent to which they
cause social disruption.6 0 Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger's
majority opinion showed great concern for local control of public
education and the administrative difficulties attendant to a deseg-
regation decree.' 61 Because of the social consequences which fol-
lowed from the ordering of a multidistrict remedy, the Court was
apparently not willing to lighten the plaintiffs proof burden any
further. Although the Court continued its remedy-focused ap-
proach to school desegregation cases, it refused to extend the doc-
trine to provide a desegration remedy beyond the school district
line.
B. Dayton I: A New Remedial Model?
The Court in Milliken did not lessen the remedial obligations
of school officials found to be operating a dual school system.
Rather, it recognized that desegregation remedies implicated two
competing interests-the interest in an integrated educational sys-
tem and the interest in local control of public education. 62 Mill-
ken determined that the latter interest outweighed the former
when the question of a multidistrict remedy was presented. 63
159. Such a presumption is analogous to the Swam presumption based on the recipro-
cal relationship between residential segregation and school sigregation. See notes 84-100
supra and accompanying text.
160. One commentator has asserted that the Milliken decision was a retreat from the
"integrationist stance in education" which had evolved, Goldstein, A Swann Song For
Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 1, 28-29
(1978), but such an assertion is not entirely accurate. The plaintiffs had sought to prove de
jure segregation in the Detroit school district alone. 418 U.S. at 745. If the theory of their
case had been that there was an interdistrict segregative effect (and they had been able to
prove it) and the Court had still refused to order an interdistrict remedy, then it could have
been called a "retreat." However, since the suburban school districts were not parties to
the action nor were they allowed to assert any defenses, id. at 730-32, such a characteriza-
tion is probably unfair to the Court.
161. 418 U.s. at 739.
162. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REv. 518, 526-27 (1980).
163. See notes 148-61 supra and accompanying text.
19801
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Moreover, one member of the Court noted that the interest in lo-
cal control could outweigh the interest in integration even when
the remedy was confined to a single school district,"' 4 because the
systemwide remedy which followed the finding of a dual school
system often resulted in an almost complete alteration of a neigh-
borhood school policy.'65 Thus, in Milliken, a majority of the
Court reacted to a potential disruption of local control by making
the standard for proving segregative intent more strict when an
effective remedy seemed to require a crossing of school district
lines.' 66 The logical consequence of this development would seem
to have been a change in the "root and branch" remedial model
formulated in Green.'67
The Supreme Court appeared to offer an alternative remedial
model in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton /).168
In Dayton I, the district court had found a "cumulative violation"
of the equal protection clause from three findings of fact.' 69 Since
the Sixth Circuit had held that this violation proved the existence
of a dual school system, it ordered a systemwide remedy. 70 The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the district court's findings
of fact were insufficient to support a finding of a dual school sys-
tem. It was not clear to the Court that the constitutional violation
had had systemwide impact.' 7 ' Therefore, a systemwide remedy
was not justified.'72 Nevertheless, since the plaintiffs had argued
on appeal that further findings of fact could have been made from
the record, the Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for
review of the record. 73
Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court,'7 4 and
discussed the analysis which lower courts should follow in formu-
lating a remedial decree:' desegregation orders which affected
164. For a discussion of Justice Powell's concurrence and dissent in Keyes, see notes
130-42 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 62-72 supra and accompanying text.
166. See generally Note, supra note I11.
167. See notes 63-72 supra and accompanying text.
168. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
169. Id. at 410-14. The three findings were: (1) substantial racial imbalance in the
school system, (2) the use of optional attendance zones, and (3) the recision of school board
resolutions which had acknowledged the responsibility for the present imbalance. Id.
170. Id. at 414.
171. Id. at 413-14.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 419.
174. Six other Justices joined in the majority opinion, Justice Brennan filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, and Justice Marshall did not participate. Id. at 407.
175. Id. at 420-21.
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pupil assignments should attempt to achieve only the racial mix-
ture that would have existed had the constitutional violation not
occurred. 7 6 This limitation appeared to override the "root and
branch" remedial formula; once a constitutional violation was
found, the lower court was to determine exactly how much segre-
gation had been caused by the intentional state action before a
remedy could be ordered. According to the Court, the district
court "must determine how much incremental segregative effect
these violations had on the racial distribution of the . . . school
population as presently constituted, when that distribution is com-
pared to what it would have been in the absence of such constitu-
tional violations."' 77 Although Swann and Keyes mandated that
the elements of segregative intent and present causation were to be
presumed (after an initial proof burden was carried),' 78 this lan-
guage suggested that future plaintiffs would have to present more
convincing proof.
Even though Keyes and Swann were cited with approval, 179
Dayton I appeared to call into question the continued validity of
their presumptions. If the presumptions were no longer valid, and
plaintiffs therefore had to prove a causal nexus between past dis-
criminatory conduct and present segregation, then systemwide
remedies would be much more difficult to obtain. To so interpret
Dayton I would be to reverse school desegregation doctrine alto-
gether. The uncertainty that arose from Dayton I was clear:
whether this new formulation would apply in a case where the
operation of the presumptions would prove a nonstatutory dual
school system.
V. COLUMBUS AND DAYTON II: BEYOND SWANN AND KEYES
If the Dayton I remedial formula were applied to a case where
a dual school system would have been proven with the use of the
Swann and Keyes presumptions, the desegregation plan ordered
would have to be less sweeping than past plans. Instead of order-
ing racial balance in every school in the district, courts would
have to determine what the racial balance of the schools would
176. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States,
429 U.S. 990, 991 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) presaged this remedial formula: "Thus,
large-scale busing is permissible only where the evidence supports a finding that the extent
of integration sought to be achieved by busing would have existed had the school authori-
ties fulfilled their constitutional obligations in the past." Id. at 995.
177. 433 U.S. at 420. For a critique of this formula, see Goldstein, supra note 158, at
40-42.
178. See notes 83-88, 116-24 supra and accompanying text.
179. 433 U.S. at 410.
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have been in the absence of discriminatory conduct, and the rem-
edy would have been limited to that difference. Only if each
school would otherwise have been racially balanced could the re-
medial plan order that degree of integration. In contrast to the
result-oriented approach which the Court had developed before
Dayton I,180 this remedial formula would produce little integra-
tion. This possibility created doubts about the Court's commit-
ment to achieving integration in public schools. 81
On July 2, 1979, the Supreme Court quieted these doubts by
reaffirming its commitment to the "root and branch" remedial
principle. In the companion cases of Columbus Board of Educa-
tion v. Penick'82 and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman
(Dayton i/),183 the Court affirmed lower court decisions which
had found dual school systems and imposed systemwide remedies.
The Columbus, Ohio, public school system was large and
highly segregated by race. 84 The district court found that the Co-
lumbus schools were intentionally segregated by race at the time
of Brown, and that the school officials had never dismantled this
dual school system; since Brown, teachers and administrators had
been assigned without regard to the racial composition of the
schools. 85 Furthermore, the school board had approved optional
attendance zones, discontiguous attendance areas, and boundary
changes which either enhanced or maintained the racial imbal-
ance, and the board had rejected suggestions that would have re-
duced that imbalance. 86 The district court concluded that it was
"fair and reasonable to draw an inference of segregative intent
from the board's actions and omissions," '187 and that the present
segregation was directly caused by these intentional acts and
omissions.' 88 Since the violation had a systemwide effect, the
court entered a systemwide remedy.'89 The Sixth Circuit af-
firmed. 90
180. See notes 63-144 supra and accompanying text.
181. See Goldstein, supra note 160, at 26-43.
182. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
183. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
184. 443 U.S. at 452. The system had over 96,000 students, more than 32% of whom
were black. Some 70% of all students attended schools which were at least 80% one-race
and half of the 172 schools were either 90% black or 90% white. Id.
185. Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 260 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 261.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 267.
190. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 583 F.2d 787, 814 (6th Cir. 1978).
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The public school system in Dayton, Ohio, was similar to the
Columbus school system in size and racial characteristics. 191 Fol-
lowing the remand from Dayton 1,92 the district court held that
the plaintiffs had failed to prove that acts of dejure segregation
over twenty years old had any current incremental segregative ef-
fect.' 93 Specifically, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had shown
neither segregative intent nor segregative effect with respect to the
challenged practices of faculty assignments, optional attendance
zones, transfers, and location and construction of new schools. 19 4
The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that at the time of Brown the
Dayton school officials were operating a dual school system, and
that they had failed to discharge their constitutional duty to dises-
tablish this system.195 The court further found that the conse-
quences of the dual school system, in conjunction with the
intentionally segregative practices since 1954, were of systemwide
impact and justified a systemwide remedy.' 96
The Supreme Court, in tandem decisions. by Justice White, af-
firmed both of these decisions. 197 In both cases, 98 the Court used
a three-stage analysis to demonstrate that school board conduct,
performed with segregative intent, had caused the segregation in
the two public school systems. 199 First, the Court held that when
Brown I was decided, both the Columbus and Dayton school offi-
cials had been operating nonstatutory dual school systems."° For
example, the district court found that in Columbus there was a
cluster of separate black schools which resulted from intentionally
segregative acts and omissions of school board members.20 1 Since
this area constituted a substantial part of the school district, the
Court applied the Keyes presumption" 2 and found that a nonstat-
191. 443 U.S. at 529. Although 40% of the students were black, 51 of the 69 schools in
the system were virtually all-white or all-black. Id.
192. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
193. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232, 1252 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
194. Id. at 1232-36.
195. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243, 247 (6th Cir. 1978).
196. Id. at 258.
197. Columbus, 443 U.S. 449, 454 (1979); Dayton II, 443 U.S. 526, 529 (1979).
198. Since the analytical framework of the decisions was virtually identical, they will
be treated as one.
199. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice White's opin-
ions. Chief Justice Burger wrote an opinion concurring in Columbus, and joined Justice
Stewart's concurrence in Columbus and his dissent in Dayton II. Justice Powell dissented
in both cases, and joined with Justice Rehnquist who dissented in both cases.
200. Columbus, 443 U.S. 455-56; Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 534.
201. Columbus, 443 U.S. 456, citing 429 F. Supp. 229, 236 (E.D. Ohio 1977).
202. See notes 117-24 supra and accompanying text.
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utory dual school system existed.20 3 Thus, the Court found inten-
tional state action which had caused segregation in public schools.
Second, the Court held that Brown II imposed a duty on local
school boards to establish a racially neutral school system, and
that this affirmative duty had not been discharged in either Co-
lumbus or Dayton:2°  school officials had knowingly failed to
eliminate the effects of past de jure segregation, which therefore
"continues the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 5
Third, the Court ruled that since 1954, Columbus and Dayton
school officials had maintained or increased the racial segregation,
through both specific discriminatory actions and the failure to act
with conscious knowledge of segregative consequences. 20 6 Since
"[sichool board policies of systemwide application necessarily
have systemwide impact" 207-and the Court indeed found such
systemwide effect in Columbus 20 8 and Dayton 2 9 -the remedies
mandated were also systemwide.
In addition to affirming systemwide desegregation plans, the
Court expressly limited the application of the Dayton I remedial
principle210 to fact situations where a systemwide violation had
not been established. 21 Even then, plaintiffs were not required to
"prove with respect to each individual act of discrimination pre-
cisely what effect it had on current patterns of segregation. 21 2
Thus, the majority's essential premise was that a dual school sys-
tem, whether statutory or nonstatutory, had the same constitu-
tional implications-namely that the only adequate remedy was
one which racially balanced each school in a district. The only
difference was that plaintiffs had a heavier burden of proof when
the dual school system was nonstatutory. Once that burden was
met, however, each type of dual school system received the same
remedy. At this analytical level, Columbus and Dayton I return
school desegregation doctrine to the standards of Swann 213 and
Keyes, 214 preserving the validity of their presumptions. Yet, on a
203. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 456-58.
204. Id. at 458; Dayton 1, 443 U.S. at 537.
205. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 459.
206. Id. at 461-63; Dayton 1I, 443 U.S. at 538-40.
207. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 466-67.
208. Id. at 467.
209. Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 541.
210. See notes 162-77 supra and accompanying text.
211. Columbus, 443 U.S., at 465-67; Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 540-41.
212. Dayton I1, 443 U.S. at 540-42.
213. See notes 82-100 supra and accompanying text.
214. See notes 104-24 supra and accompanying text.
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different level, these decisions extend the doctrine beyond earlier
standards.
Justice White's three-stage analysis extends the doctrine in two
ways, affecting both the element of causation and of intent. Stage
one fixes the inquiry into relevant segregative conduct farther
back in time: in Columbus and Dayton 11 the inquiry was into the
status of the school districts in 1954, when Brown was decided.215
Once a causal relationship has been proven, stage two recognizes
an affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school system. In con-
junction, these two stages effectively presume a causal connection
between past discriminatory conduct and the school segregation
which exists at the time of suit. This linkage is crucial for plain-
tiffs, for the causal connection between past discrimination and
present segregation attenuates with time.216
It is important to note, however, that plaintiffs must still prove
the existence of a state-imposed dual school system at some point
in time.21 7 In other words, the school officials must have had a
duty to act before stage two can be implemented. If a court re-
quired strict showings of intentionally segregative behavior which
produced a dual school system, plaintiffs would not benefit at all
from the three-stage analysis; they would still have to satisfy the
standards of segregative intent as to the past conduct, but at a
point further back in time. Nevertheless, the establishment of seg-
regative intent as to this past conduct under Justice White's analy-
sis is accomplished more easily since racial discrimination was, for
the most part, more blatant in 1954.
The third stage of the analysis affects the element of segrega-
tive intent. Given the affirmative duty to disestablish a dual sys-
215. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 455-57; Dayton 1, 443 U.S. at 537-38.
216. Fiss, supra note 76, at 703. Professor Fiss further suggests that the causation re-
quirement was adopted because of a need to attribute responsibility, but that after a certain
point such an attribution becomes unrealistic. Id. Another writer has argued that the
"fault concept" eventually gives rise to a class of innocents who feel no responsibility, and
consequently show resentment when burdened with the responsibility of remedying past
discrimination in which they played no part. Freeman, supra note 129, at 1055. See also,
Brest, supra note 90, at 37-38.
217. It is possible that the 1954 date used in Columbus and Dayton 11is not the critical
measuring point. For instance, the affirmative duty principle which was developed would
also cover the following situation: An hypothetical school district in 1965 has a small
number of minority students, but also an intentionally caused dual school system. Second,
assume demographic trends which intensified the segregated conditions between 1965 and
1980. Third, assume evidence that the defendant school officials have done nothing to
correct the situation since 1965. The point is clear. the significance of the year 1954 is that
it signaled a warning to all future defendants that they might have a duty to act.
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tem (stage two), stage three creates a presumption of segregative
intent from the failure of the school officials to act. The impor-
tance of this presumption is obvious: it reinforces the establish-
ment of intent from inaction.
Once a segregated school system exists, very little must be
done to maintain the racially separate character. Because there
are endless reasons for failing to act, an inference of segregative
intent from omissions is necessarily tenuous. Consequently, in de-
fending allegations of an intentional maintenance of a dual school
system, school officials could defend against allegations of inten-
tional maintenance of a dual school system by simply asserting
that they had taken no discriminatory action. Once there exists an
affirmative duty to act, however, the inference of segregative in-
tent from inaction becomes more appealing. In effect, stage three
places upon the defendant school officials the burden of demon-
strating other reasons for their inaction. This three-stage analysis
reduces the amount of proof needed to establish a constitutional
violation"' 8 and makes it easier to obtain a systemwide desegrega-
tion plan.
It is interesting to note that in Justice White's opinions in Co-
lumbus and Dayton II there was no mention of the socially dis-
ruptive effects of a systemwide remedy. In striking a balance
between the remedy of a constitutional violation and deference to
local interests, the majority seemed more concerned with the for-
mer. Not all of the Justices were satisfied with this balance. Chief
Justice Burger 219 and Justice Stewart220 focused on the proper role
of a reviewing court in a school desegregation case. They would
have deferred to district court findings as to the existence of segre-
gative intent and present causation,22' principally because of the
greater familiarity with local facts and circumstances that these
218. The Court's new standard for segregative intent bears a remarkable resemblance
to the standard that Professor Freeman argues had been announced in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Freeman, supra note 129, at 1096-98. What makes this
resemblance even more remarkable is that Griggs was decided under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The Griggs standard of segregative intent has been held not to apply as
the constitutional standard. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 236-39 (1977). In Profes-
sor Freeman's words, "[Olne is intentionally discriminating if one continues to use a prac-
tice or maintain a condition that disadvantages a minority group without being able to
justify the rationality of the practice or condition." Freeman, supra note 129, at 1098.
219. The Chief Justice concurred in the Columbus judgment. 443 U.S. at 468-69.
220. Justice Stewart concurred in the Columbus judgment and dissented from the Day-
ton judgment. The Chief Justice joined in both opinions. Id. at 469-79.
221. Id. at 469-70 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting).
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courts have.222 Under such a view, the Court would abdicate its
role in directing school desegregation and return to the formula of
Brown II which was a notable failure.2 3
The principal dissenters were Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
who argued that the majority's analytical technique for finding a
nonstatutory dual school system was misconceived. Justice Pow-
ell's dissent emphasized that the majority had failed to appreciate
the value of local control of public education and the social costs
of systemwide remedies,224 while Justice Rehnquist focused on
what he perceived to be the doctrinal emasculation of the tradi-
tional requirements of segregative intent and present causation.225
The key to Justice Powell's dissent was his assertion that after
twenty-five years of school desegregation litigation, "the federal
judiciary should be limiting rather than expanding the extent to
which courts are operating the public school systems of our coun-
try. ' 226 Justice Powell then presented two points in support of a
more limited role for federal courts. First, he maintained that
school segregation was caused by residential segregation, which in
turn resulted from factors "for which no school board is responsi-
ble. ' 227 Consequently, he reasoned, remedial orders would be
only temporarily effective and resegregation would inevitably fol-
low.2 28 Implicit in this argument was a rejection of the Swann
presumption which had recognized a reciprocal effect between res-
idential and school segregation.229 The Swann presumption re-
quired school officials to prove both that residential segregation
had caused the school segregation and that this residential segre-
gation had been caused by factors other than school segregation;
the mere assertion that residential segregation had caused the
school segregation would not be an adequate rebuttal. In his dis-
sent, Justice Powell assumed that factors other than school segre-
gation had, in fact, caused the residential segregation, without any
proof of this by the school officials.23° Thus, Justice Powell ap-
222. Id. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart first suggested such deferral in Carter
v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290, 294 (1970).
223. For a discussion of the failure of the Brown II approach, see Wilkinson, supra
note 38, at 485-505.
224. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 479 (Powell, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 489; Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 542 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
226. 443 U.S. at 480 (Powell, J., dissenting).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 483-84.
229. See notes 82-88 supra and accompanying text.
230. 443 U.S. at 480-81. Note also Justice Powell's comment in Austin Independent
School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976): "The principal cause of racial and
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peared to believe the exact opposite of the Swann presump-
tion-that residential segregation caused school segregation and
that the plaintiffs had to prove otherwise.
The second point made by Justice Powell was that systemwide
remedies caused social upheaval by means of the usurpation of
local control and the displacement of neighborhood schools.3
Justice Powell noted "economic and educational" reasons for the
preservation of neighborhood schools, and he rejected "a judicial
approach that ignores other relevant factors in favor of an exclu-
sive focus on racial balance in every school. ' 232 He also predicted
that the result of the majority's doctrine would be the abandon-
ment of public schools by those with the means to do so.233
Justice Powell's deference to local control is unsound.234 Local
control did not desegregate southern school systems.2 35 Indeed,
the fact that school officials are still being haled into court suggests
that local control will not produce a unitary school system; if the
threat of court-ordered desegregation plans has not moved local
officials to action, it is doubtful that their good faith-upon which
Justice Powell would rely-will prove more efficacious. Further-
more, since such school officials have not taken steps to improve
the condition of minority children in the past, there is little reason
to believe they will do so in the future.
While Justice Powell focused on the social consequences of a
systemwide remedial order, Justice Rehnquist directly attacked
the majority's three-stage analysis. He asserted that the Court had
emasculated two of the elements of the constitutional violation:
segregative intent and present causation.236 As he viewed it, the
majority's inquiry into the condition of school systems in 1954,
along with their imposition of an affirmative duty to establish a
unitary school system, meant the virtual elimination of these ele-
ments.237 His reasoning was straightforward. In 1954, school sys-
tems could not have had notice of what Brown required338
Furthermore, the relevance of past conduct by school officials de-
ethnic imbalance in urban public schools across the country-North and South-is the
imbalance in residential patterns." Id. at 994.
231. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 483-89 (Powell, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 484.
233. Id.
234. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 38.
235. See notes 35-61 supra and accompanying text.
236. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 490-91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).




pended entirely on whether segregation caused by that conduct
still existed,23 9 and an affirmative duty to desegregate arose only
after a court found that a constitutional violation existed.240
Echoing his Dayton I opinion,24' Justice Rehnquist would have
required proof of the precise extent to which past discriminatory
conduct had current segregative effect and he would have tailored
the desegregation plan to remedy only that increment.242
Justice Rehnquist's dissent implicitly draws a distinction be-
tween the constitutional effects of statutory, as opposed to nonstat-
utory, dual school systems. 243 This distinction was rejected in
Keyes because its adoption would have resulted in different reme-
dial standards for the identical segregative effects of southern and
northern school systems.2' Such a result would run contrary to
the fundamental implication of Brown that regardless of how a
dual school system arose, its existence violated the Constitution.
A unanimous Supreme Court had recognized this principle in
Green v. County School Board24 when it held:
Brown II was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual
systems .... [S]chool boards such as the respondent then oper-
ating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless charged with
the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch.246
Although Green involved a statutory dual school system,247 the
Court in Keyes applied the same remedy to a nonstatutory dual
school system;248 the only difference was in the proof required to
establish a constitutional violation.
In Part II of his dissent, Justice Rehnquist disputed the validity
of inferring segregative intent from post-1954 school board con-
duct. 249 Although Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the infer-
ence of segregative intent was one factor to be considered in a
finding of segregative intent, he reasoned that the standard
adopted by the majority was the test of intent used in tort law:
239. Id. at 501.
240. Id. at 503-04.
241. See notes 163-82 supra and accompanying text.
242. 443 U.S. at 520-21.
243. Id. at 497-500.
244. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. at 203.
245. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
246. Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added).
247. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
248. See notes 111-24 supra and accompanying text.
249. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 508-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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that one intends the natural, probable, and foreseeable effects of
one's decisions.2 5 0 He noted that the Court had previously re-
jected the application of this test in equal protection cases.25'
More fundamentally, he questioned the validity of an inference of
segregative intent from the omissions of school officials. His con-
tention on this point seems to be without a sound basis on either
evidentiary or precedential grounds. Although the inference of
segregative intent from affirmative action is stronger if school offi-
cials have had an opportunity to facilitate or produce integration,
the inference of intent from failure to act is also valid. This infer-
ence was recognized in Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Aus-
tin Independent School District v. United States,252 an opinion
joined in by Justice Rehnquist.
Contrary to Justice Rehnquist's contentions, the majority re-
moved neither the element of discriminatory purpose nor the ele-
ment of causation. They did, however, implement a result-
oriented approach which lowered the level of proof required to
establish a constitutional violation and thereby made an effective
desegregation remedy easier to obtain. Although Justice Rehn-
quist cited his Dayton I opinion as the "basic line of inquiry
which should govern school desegregation litigation, 12 53 the ma-
jority properly limited the Dayton I remedial formula to cases
where the proven violation was not systemwide.2,54 In cases like
Columbus and Dayton II a systemwide violation had been
proven, and, therefore, the Dayton I formula was inappropriate.
In the face of doubts created by Dayton I, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its commitment to integrated schools. The possibility
thus remains that school officials will create a "system without a
'White school' and a 'Negro school', but just schools." '55
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has wavered from time to time, it
has apparently developed a school desegregation doctrine which is
250. Id. at 510-12.
251. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). See also Note, supra
note 111, at 131-5 1.
252. 429 U.S. 990 (1976). Justice Powell wrote: "Whether the Austin school authorities
intentionally discriminated against minorities or simply failed to fulfill affirmative obliga-
tions to eliminate segregation, the remedy appears to exceed that necessary to eliminate the
effect of any official acts or omissions." Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
253. 443 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
254. See notes 101-43 supra and accompany text.
255. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968).
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committed to the achievement of actual integration in public
schools. This has been accomplished despite a growing concern
over the extent of intervention by federal courts and the social
disruption attendant to the remedial decrees. In the fall of 1979,
an eloquent rebuttal was offered to the assertion that twenty-five
years of federal judicial oversight of public schools is enough:
Linda Brown Smith, the titular plaintiff in the landmark school
desegregation case, moved to reopen Brown v. Board of Education
because her daughter attends a segregated school.25 6 After
twenty-five years, the public schools of Topeka, Kansas, remain
segregated. Seemingly, the problem is not that the Supreme Court
has required too much of local school officials; rather, it has never
required enough.
PAUL ERIC GUTERMANN
256. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1979, at 4E, col. 2.
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